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Abstract: This paper outlines an argument against religious belief: the 
X-claim argument. The argument is novel at least in the sense that it has 
not yet been clearly articulated or addressed before in the philosophical 
literature. However, the argument is closely related to two more 
familiar varieties of argument currently receiving philosophical 
attention, namely: (i) arguments from religious diversity, and (ii) 
naturalistic debunking arguments (e.g. Freudian, Marxist, and 
evolutionary). I set out the X-claim argument, show that it has some 
prima facie plausibility, distinguish it from these other two arguments 
with which it might easily be confused, and, finally, explain why it has 
some significant advantages over these more familiar arguments against 
religious belief. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper outlines an argument against religious belief: the X-claim argument. The 
argument is novel at least in the sense that it has not yet been clearly articulated or 
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addressed before in the philosophical literature. However, the argument is closely 
related to two more familiar varieties of argument currently receiving philosophical 
attention, namely: (i) arguments from religious diversity, and (ii) naturalistic 
debunking arguments (e.g. Freudian, Marxist, and evolutionary). I set out the X-
claim argument, show that it has some prima facie plausibility, distinguish it from 
these other two arguments with which it might easily be confused, and, finally, 
explain why it has some significant advantages over these more familiar arguments 
against religious belief. 
 
PART ONE: THE X-CLAIM ARGUMENT AGAINST RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
 
1. X-claims 
 
Humans have a well-established capacity for generating false but nevertheless rich 
and seductive systems of belief. One variety of false belief to which we are 
particularly prone – and in which psychologists are taking an increasing interest  – 
is belief in extraordinary hidden agency: beings, acting on the basis of beliefs and 
desires, that are not visible to the naked eye in the way human beings usually are. 
Belief in the existence of such agents is ubiquitous, as Steven Pinker notes: 
In all human cultures, people believe that the soul lives on after death, that 
ritual can change the physical world and divine the truth, and that illness and 
misfortune are caused and alleviated by a variety of invisible person-like 
entities: spirits, ghosts, saints, evils, demons, cherubim or Jesus, devils and 
gods. 
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All cultures, you might ask? Yes, all cultures. I give you an example of a 
culture we're well familiar with, that of the contemporary United States. The 
last time I checked the figures, 25% of Americans believe in witches, 50% in 
ghosts, 50% in the devil, 50% believe that the Book of Genesis is literally 
true, 69% believe in angels, 87% believe Jesus was raised from the dead, and 
96% believe in a god or a universal spirit. (Pinker 2004) 
Humans often invoke hidden agency to account for what they cannot otherwise 
explain. When we could not explain why the planets moved in the way they do, we 
supposed they must be, or be controlled by, gods. When we could not otherwise 
explain natural diseases and disasters, we believed them to be the work of 
malevolent beings, such as witches and demons. When we couldn’t explain why the 
seasons rolled by, or why plants sprang back to life in the spring, we supposed that 
these events must be under the control of other hidden agents. As a result of this 
tendency to reach for extraordinary hidden agency, particularly when presented 
with a mystery, we have hypothesized countless hidden beings and developed rich 
and complex narratives about them.  
 
Belief in extraordinary hidden agency is often accompanied by a belief in super-
powers and super-faculties. The hidden agents are themselves typically supposed to 
possess certain extraordinary powers and faculties. In addition, our own ability to 
detect the presence of such agents is often explained by our possessing such 
faculties. Mediums claim the uncanny ability to experience and communicate with 
the dead. Some suppose they encounter or communicate with other kinds of hidden 
being, including demons and gods (the Delphic oracle, for example). More recently, 
our ability to detect hidden agents is believed to have been technologically 
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enhanced: consider EVP, in which spirit voices can supposedly be heard in radio 
static. Belief systems involving such hidden agents also often include beliefs in 
extraordinary or magically-imbued objects – such as lucky charms, totems, and 
holy relics – and/or extraordinary or magical events – including planetary 
alignments, religious miracles, moments of divine creation.  
 
Such beliefs are not restricted to the unintelligent or uneducated. A Gallup poll 
conducted in 2001 suggested U.S. college students are at least as likely to believe in 
ghosts as the general population (40% to 39%).1 Even some of the most outlandish 
X-claim belief systems can boast sophisticated devotees. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle –
creator of that quintessentially rational character Sherlock Holmes – believed in 
fairies and was successfully hoaxed by two little girls armed with paper cutouts and 
a film camera. In the U.S., Young Earth Creationism (the view that the Judeo-
Christian God exists and created the universe and all living ‘kinds’ in just six days 
sometime in the 10,000 years) is defended by PhDs holding tenured university 
positions.  
 
Those who believe in such hidden beings usually consider their belief reasonable. 
Often, belief is justified by an appeal to testimony. Believers refer to reports of 
individuals (mediums, gurus, etc.) claiming either to have some form of direct 
knowledge of the hidden agents themselves, or at least to have witnessed 
extraordinary events involving them. Belief in such agency is also often rooted in 
certain kinds of subjective experience. Believers may report a powerful sense that 
they are themselves directly subjectively aware of, and perhaps receiving 
communications or revelations from, some kind of otherwise invisible being, be it a 
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deceased relative, a nature spirit, an angel, or a god. Typically, this direct and 
immediate access is supposed to be rooted not in ordinary sense perception but in 
some additional sense such as a god- or spirit-sense. Henceforth, by 'subjective 
experiences' I'll mean experiences of this supposed sort. 
 
Sometimes, such appeals to testimony and subjective experience are supplemented 
by some supposedly 'hard' evidence (a photograph of a fairy, for example, or a 
miracle scientifically authenticated by the Congregatio de Causis Sanctorum). 
 
By X-claims I shall mean claims about such hidden beings - agents, who act on the 
basis of beliefs and desires, but who aren't usually visible to the naked eye in the 
way that human beings, cats, dogs, etc., are - and associated magical and/or 
extraordinary powers, faculties, objects and events2. X-claims are claims with 
which we humans are peculiarly fascinated. They are also claims about which we 
have proven to be highly unreliable judges of truth. Around the world and 
throughout history we find communities believing, on the basis of testimony and 
subjective experience, X-claims that we can be justifiably confident are false. We 
suppose, rightly, that those who believed in the gods of ancient Egypt, Greece, and 
Rome were mistaken. Many within the ‘skeptic’ community believe, justifiably, 
that TV’s Psychic Sally doesn't really communicate with the dead, and that Conan 
Doyle’s beliefs in spiritualism and the Cottingley fairies were mistaken.  
 
Part of the case for supposing we're unreliable judges of the truth regarding X-
claims is provided by X-claim diversity. Some beliefs involving such hidden agents 
are incompatible with others. Religious belief provides one obvious example – 
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religions disagree about the number of gods, the characteristics of those gods, and 
so on. Only a minority of these conflicting god claims can be true. 
 
However, X-claim diversity is just one facet of a much broader range of evidence 
supporting the view that we are generally unreliable judges of their truth, 
particularly when judgement is grounded in some combination of testimony and 
subjective experience. Many X-claims have been straightforwardly falsified. Each 
year, a variety of such claims, even when they might initially have seemed well 
supported, are successfully debunked in the pages of Skeptical Inquirer magazine. 
A significant proportion has been shown to have resulted, or likely resulted, from 
fraud, from the misidentification of natural phenomena, and so on. Here are a few 
of my favourite examples (drawn from countless others): the Cottingham fairy 
photographs were almost certainly forged using paper cutouts by the two young 
girls - there were no fairies3; a sneezing spirit-being supposedly witnessed and 
recorded by the Haunted Homes TV programme turned out to be an automatic air-
freshener (though that detail was not broadcast)4; and the Flatwoods Monster (a 
man-like figure with red face and pointed hood who hissed and glided toward the 
group shortly after UFOs were spotted) was almost certainly a barn owl.5 In none 
of these cases was any sort of extraordinary hidden agency actually witnessed. Our 
tendency to systematically over-detect agency is in part due to a phenomenon 
known as pareidolia, where the mind perceives a familiar pattern where none 
actually exists. For example, we are particularly prone to see faces where none exist 
(in clouds, in the embers of a fire, etc.) and to hear voices in random sounds. More 
generally, psychologists have noted our 'readiness to attribute intentionality to 
objects on the basis of minimal cues' (French and Stone (2013), 197). 
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Note that what evidence we have for our unreliability regarding X-claims is for a 
proneness toward false positive belief in X-claims. We know, regarding our belief 
in such hidden agents and associated magical and/or extraordinary powers, 
faculties, objects and events, that a very large proportion of these beliefs are 
mistaken. By contrast, there’s little evidence to suggest we're prone to false 
negative X-claim beliefs - i.e. that we're highly susceptible to mistakenly 
disbelieving in hidden beings etc. that actually are there.6 
 
Struck by this peculiar proneness to false positive beliefs across the range of X-
claims, those working in the cognitive science of religion have posited a 
mechanism to account for it: an evolved Hyperactive Agency Detecting Device 
(HADD) (Barrett 2004, Clark and Barrett 2010). Scientists have suggested that we 
have evolved to over-detect agency because, while over-detection of agency is not 
particularly costly to us in terms of survival and reproduction in our ancestral 
environment, a failure to detect agents that are there can be very costly indeed. A 
sabre-toothed tiger missed, for example, is likely to remove you from the gene pool. 
This constitutional tendency to over-detect agency explains why, for example, 
when you hear a rustle in the bushes as you walk home alone in the dark, your first 
instinctive reaction is to think 'There's someone there!' The evolution of an HADD 
may account for a tendency to believe an agent is present even when none can be 
clearly observed, resulting in belief in ghosts and spirits, for example. 
 
Of course, none of this is to say that no X-claim is true, or that no one can ever 
reasonably believe an X-claim. Perhaps the fairies will finally conclusively reveal 
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themselves, demonstrating their magic to scientific experts and appearing on 
daytime TV. Even if the agents remain hidden, evidence sufficient to establish their 
existence beyond reasonable doubt might be revealed. Perhaps scientific 
investigation will establish conclusively that some people really can communicate 
with the deceased. However, X-claims aren't usually accompanied by evidence of 
such strength. Typically, they are justified by appeal to testimony and/or subjective 
experiences of the sort outlined above.  
 
2. Sylvia and the dead 
 
Consider the following hypothetical, but I suggest typical, example of someone 
strongly committed to a system of belief built around X-claims. Sylvia has a strong 
subjective impression that the dead walk among us. She is sometimes overcome by 
a powerful sense that the dead are present and making themselves known to her. 
Sylvia has thoughts that seem to her to be communications or revelations from the 
deceased. Sylvia believes these thoughts often provide helpful guidance. In addition, 
Sylvia has investigated and finds compelling the testimony of others (friends, 
relations, the authors of books she has read, etc.) concerning ghosts, spirits, and 
communications from beyond the grave, including dramatic tales of disasters 
averted as a result of people receiving such messages.  
 
Suppose Sylvia is now presented with the evidence I have outlined above: evidence 
that we humans are highly prone to false positive beliefs in X-claims when those 
beliefs are grounded in a combination of testimony and subjective experience. This 
evidence is new to Sylvia. How should she respond?  
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3. Knowledge defeat 
 
Readers familiar with the literature on epistemic defeat may anticipate an argument 
turning on the thought that Sylvia has just come to possess a defeater for her X-
claim beliefs, and that consequently she can no longer be said to know that the dead 
walk among us. Defeat cases involves a belief losing some epistemic status - 
typically including knowledge - in circumstances of a certain kind.  
 
Here's a familiar putative example. Suppose I observe that the widgets on an 
assembly line look red, and so come to believe they are red. I'm then told by an 
authority I know to be generally reliable and trustworthy that the widgets are lit by 
a red light that makes even non-red things look red. On considering this case, many 
intuit that on acquiring this new evidence I come to possess an undermining 
defeater for my original belief. They suppose that, as a consequence of my coming 
to possess this new evidence, that I can no longer be said to know the widgets are 
red. 
 
Here's a second example. Suppose I seem to see a snake on the ground in front of 
me, and so come to believe there's a snake there. Then a reliable and trustworthy 
authority tells me that I have been given a drug that produces super-realistic visual 
snake-hallucinations. Again, many have the intuition that, given this new evidence, 
I can no longer be said to know there's a snake there. 
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In both the above cases I come to possess new evidence that the method by which I 
formed my original belief is, in the circumstances in which I formed it, not to be 
trusted. And this, it's widely supposed, is sufficient to undermine knowledge. 
 
The above intuitions about defeat might now be deployed in an argument for the 
conclusion that, on being presented with the evidence that we humans are highly 
prone to false positive X-claim beliefs when those beliefs are grounded in some 
combination of testimony and subjective experience, Sylvia can no longer be said 
to know the dead walk among us. For she, too, comes to possess evidence that the 
method by which she formed her X-claim beliefs is not to be trusted. 
 
4. Rationality defeat 
 
I will avoid framing my argument in terms of knowledge defeat. I think the jury is 
out on whether knowledge is lost in such cases. Maria Lasonen Aarnio (2010) 
suggests the intuition that knowledge must be lost in such cases is misleading. She 
argues that externalists should take seriously the suggestion that knowledge can be 
retained even in the face of seemingly strong defeating evidence. 
 
Suppose, for example, that I just stick with my belief that the widgets are red even 
after having been given good evidence that they are lit by a red light that makes 
them look red even when they're not. But suppose that evidence is misleading: there 
is no red light, and the widgets are indeed red. Then, suggests Lasonen Aarnio, I 
may still know the widgets are red. For it may be that the relevant externalist 
conditions on knowledge are satisfied (so, for example, the method by which I 
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arrive at my belief may still be reliable or safe7). So why do so many of us have the 
intuition that knowledge is lost in such cases? Lasonen Aarnio suggests that what 
misleads us is the fact that it is, in a certain sense, unreasonable for believers to 
continue to believe under such circumstances. Lasonen Aarnio says 'subjects who 
retain belief in defeat cases act in an epistemically unreasonable manner.' (2010, 
12) 
 
In what sense unreasonable? Consider, for example, the rule or method of belief 
formation that tells you to believe that p when you see that p even in the presence 
of good evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted. This method 
is, in a sense, good, in that if you follows it, beliefs obtained as a result will be safe 
(given you can see that p only if p is true, this policy cannot produce a false 
belief). 
However, the above method is epistemically a bad method to adopt, suggests 
Lasonen Aarnio, because adopting it results in a bad disposition. Lasonen Aarnio 
notes that a 'subject who adopts this method is also disposed to believe p when she 
merely seems to see that p in the presence of evidence for thinking that her senses 
are not to be trusted' (2010, 14 my italics). But then, were a subject to adopt the 
method, they would end up believing p in a significant proportion of cases in 
which the evidence that their senses are not to be trusted is not misleading. So 
while the method is indeed safe, its adoption results in dispositions that are not 
knowledge conducive: 
This is why the rule believe p when you see that p in the presence of 
evidence for thinking that your senses are not to be trusted is not part of 
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a policy that is knowledge conducive in the intended sense. A 
reasonable subject would not adopt or follow such a rule, even though it 
is success entailing. (2010, 15) 
 
Regarding subjects who adopt the method of dogmatically adhering to previous 
beliefs in the face of non-misleading new evidence that their senses are not to be 
trusted, Lasonen Aarnio says: 
 
it will seem to them as if they are following the same method as in good 
cases, thereby retaining knowledge, whereas they will in reality be 
retaining beliefs in falsehoods. Overall, it would be much better to 
follow a policy recommending the revision of belief in the light of new 
evidence. This is why reasonable subjects adjust their beliefs in defeat 
cases. (2010, 15) 
 
Someone who is presented with evidence that the method by which they acquired 
their original belief is untrustworthy should withhold belief. If they fail to do so, 
they are being (in Lasonen Aarnio's sense) unreasonable, and can be properly 
criticised for sticking with their original belief. But that's not to say they are not 
employing a reliable or safe method, or indeed that they don't know. The reason 
why many of us intuit that knowledge is lost in such cases, suggests Lasonen 
Aarnio, is that we assume that if a belief is unreasonable then it can't constitute 
knowledge. Lasonen Aarnio questions that assumption. 
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Let's now return to the case of Sylvia. I shan't argue that, given the new evidence 
available to her, Sylvia can't be said to know the dead walk among us. Perhaps, for 
the reasons Lasonen Aarnio suggests, Sylvia does still know (if she really is aware 
of the presence of the deceased by virtue of some sort of safe method, say). 
However, if Lasonen Aarnio is correct, then if Sylvia continues to believe on the 
same basis, she no longer believes reasonably. If Sylvia sticks to her guns and 
continues to believe, she can be properly criticised for doing so.  
 
Perhaps we can still talk about a form of defeat in such cases, however. For if 
Lasonen Aarnio is correct, it remains true to say that some positive epistemic status 
is lost. Only what is lost is, if not knowledge, then at least reasonable belief. So let's 
say that in such cases we come to possess, if not a knowledge defeater, then at least 
a rationality defeater. When I acquire evidence that forming snake beliefs on the 
basis of their visual appearance is a method that, in my drugged state, is 
untrustworthy, I come to possess a rationality defeater for my original belief. But 
then it appears that so, too, does Sylvia after she acquires evidence that forming X-
claim beliefs on the basis of testimony and subjective experience is an 
untrustworthy method. 
 
5. On individuating methods 
 
According to externalists, in determining whether Sylvia knows, we should be 
individuating methods externalistically. True, the methods employed by Sylvia and 
other X-claim believers might, from the point of view of the various subjects 
involved, seem very similar. However, it may be that, unlike other X-claim 
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believers also relying on a subjective sense of presence, Sylvia is employing a 
method that actually is safe. She really does possess a reliably-functioning spirit 
sense. But then, assuming an externalist account on which, say, knowledge is true 
belief delivered by such a safe method, Sylvia can still know her X-claim belief is 
true. When it comes to assessing whether Sylvia knows, we shouldn't count Sylvia 
as employing the 'same method' as other X-claim believers who happen to believe 
on the basis of subjectively similar experiences. 
 
However note that, even if, when it comes to determining whether Sylvia knows the 
dead walk among us, we should be individuating methods externalistically, that's 
not to say that Sylvia's continued X-claim beliefs remain reasonable once she 
comes to possess the (in fact misleading) evidence that the method by which she 
acquired her beliefs is untrustworthy. Sylvia's continued X-claim beliefs are 
unreasonable in Lasonen Aarnio's sense because, as a consequence of her adopting 
a policy of continuing to believe even when presented with evidence that her 
method of arriving at belief is untrustworthy, Sylvia manifests a disposition that is 
not knowledge conducive.  
 
6. The X-claim argument against religious belief 
 
Religions are typically built around X-claims. They usually posit hidden agents – a 
god or gods – with extraordinary or miraculous faculties and powers (some forms 
of Buddhism being a notable exception). Associated with these super-beings are 
extraordinary and miraculous objects and events – miraculous healings, holy places, 
relics, and so on. Religions also typically involve the thought that some or all of us 
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possess some sort of super-faculty by which we may come to possess knowledge of 
these beings. 
 
Mainstream Christianity is an obvious example of a religion in which X-claims play 
a major role. Mainstream Christians believe in an invisible agent – the Judeo-
Christian God – possessing both the super-power of omnipotence and the super-
faculty of omniscience. They also believe in associated extraordinary and 
miraculous events, including the pivotal miracle of the resurrection. For most 
Christians, these X-claims lie at the heart of their faith. Some add further X-claims 
to this doctrinal core, such as claims about holy relics (the Turin shroud, say) or the 
ongoing miraculous activities of saints.   
 
Most religious people – including most Christians – suppose they hold their 
religious beliefs reasonably, or at least not unreasonably. Many hold their belief 
primarily on the basis of testimony and/or subjective experience. Consider a 
hypothetical Christian, Peter, who supports his core Christian X-claim beliefs by 
pointing to testimony in the form of scripture and reports of miracles ancient and 
modern. In addition, Peter supposes he has direct awareness of God and the truth of 
various central Christian X-claims, an awareness he believes is afforded him by a 
sensus divinitatis and the activity of the Holy Spirit.  
 
But if Sylvia should be skeptical about her X-claims once she acquires evidence of 
the untrustworthiness of the method by which she acquired them, shouldn’t Peter 
similarly be skeptical about his religious X-claims once he learns of 
untrustworthiness of that same method? After all, like Sylvia, Peter considers his 
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beliefs justified by virtue of testimony and his own subjective experiences. But the 
evidence reveals this is precisely the sort of situation in which we are highly prone 
to false positive belief in X-claims. If this evidence should lead Sylvia to withhold 
from believing her X-claims, shouldn’t it also lead Peter to withhold from 
believing? If it's unreasonable for Sylvia to continue to believe after coming to 
possess this new evidence, surely it is no less unreasonable for Peter to continue to 
believe. 
 
Note that Peter might suppose, correctly, that, unlike most X-claim believers, he 
really is employing a safe method of acquiring beliefs, a method that is in fact 
delivering knowledge. Nevertheless, Peter believes unreasonably, in Laasonen 
Arnio's sense, if he possesses the (in fact misleading) information that the method 
by which he acquired his beliefs is unreliable and not to be trusted. Under such 
circumstances, Peter shouldn't believe, even if, as a matter of fact, he's right in 
supposing he knows. 
 
Admittedly, there are forms of religion in which X-claims play little if any role. 
Consider an anti-realist version of Christianity on which the claims that God exists 
and miracles happen are not understood as being literally true, or a redacted version 
in which all reference to God, miracles and an afterlife are removed leaving only 
edifying tales and moral teaching (along the lines of Thomas Jefferson’s The Life 
and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth). The X-claim argument constitutes no a threat to 
religious beliefs of that sort. 
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However, for many religions, including the mainstream monotheistic religions as 
understood by the vast majority of their followers, X-claims form an essential part 
of their core doctrine. And for any religion in which X-claims form an essential part 
of core doctrine, where those X-claims are grounded largely in testimony and 
subjective experiences of the sort outlined above, the X-claim argument appears to 
pose a significant threat to reasonable belief. 
 
My aim here has been to sketch out in broad terms the X-claim argument against 
religion in such a way that it might be seen to have at least some prima facie 
plausibility. Let S&T be a combination of testimony and/or subjective experiences 
of a certain sort (a subjective sense of presence of, and/or 
revelation/communication from, some hidden agency, apparently delivered other 
than by the usual perceptual routes). Then one way of summarizing the X-claim 
argument is like so: 
 
(1) We are highly prone to false positive X-claim beliefs when our beliefs are 
grounded in just S&T. 
(2) Learning (1) supplies a subject with a rationality defeater for any positive X-
claim belief of theirs grounded in just S&T. 
(3) S’s religious positive X-claim beliefs are grounded in just S&T. 
(4) Learning (1) supplies S with a rationality defeater for their religious positive X-
claim beliefs. 
 
The above argument would appear to apply to many religious folk (and of course 
also to others who believe e.g., that the dead walk among us, etc.). Their religious 
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positive X-claim beliefs are grounded in just S&T. But then, given (2), their 
learning (1) supplies them with a rationality defeater for their religious X-claim 
beliefs. In which case, on learning (1), they should cease holding those religious 
beliefs, and can be properly criticised for not doing so. I have suggested the above 
argument has a good deal of prima facie plausibility. Premise (1) is surely true. I 
consider premise (2) highly plausible. 
 
I now anticipate six responses to the above argument. 
 
First, believers may insist that, even if (2) is true, that’s not yet to say their religious 
positive X-claim belief grounded in just S&T faces a rationality defeater. It's 
usually acknowledged by those who frame these kinds of objection within the 
vocabulary of ‘defeat’ that defeaters can be defeated. If I acquire evidence that the 
widgets before me that look red are illuminated by a red light that makes non-red 
things look red, then that surely supplies me with a rationality defeater for my 
perceptually grounded belief that the widgets are red. But if then I acquire further 
evidence that I'm viewing the widgets through a filter that corrects the colour 
appearance of things illuminated by that red light, then my rationality defeater faces 
rational defeat. Similarly, while learning (1) might generate a rationality defeater 
for my religious X-claim beliefs grounded in just S&T, I might nevertheless 
possess evidence defeating that defeater. I might possess evidence of some further 
feature F of my situation such that, while positive X-claim beliefs grounded in just 
S&T are usually false, that's not the case when this further feature F is present.  
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What might this further feature F be? What might, say, a Christian whose religious 
belief is grounded solely in S&T say about the peculiarities of their own situation 
that would allow them reasonably to suppose they possess a defeater for the 
rationality defeater that (1) might otherwise appear to supply? 
 
I won’t explore this issue further here other than to say that I suspect the prospects 
of a religious person being able to say something reasonable along these lines are 
fairly dim. In particular, note that to possess a defeater for the above rationality 
defeater, they will need good evidence that their situation involves some feature F 
that, when present, has the consequence that positive X-claim beliefs based on S&T 
are usually true. It won't do for the religious person to defend the rationality of their 
continued belief by just insisting without evidence that their situation differs from 
that of other X-claim believers in that, unlike those other believers, they really do 
employ a method that's safe. For even if what they insist is true, that won't rescue 
their belief from the charge of irrationality given this same policy of dogmatic 
insistence, when employed by other X-claim believers, will result in widespread 
false belief. That's still a policy that's unreasonable, in Lasonen Aarnio's sense, for 
it results in a disposition that is not knowledge conducive. 
 
Second, critics may point out that my argument won’t apply to, say, the members of 
isolated religious communities largely unaware of (1). The X-claim argument is a 
threat only so far as the religious beliefs of those aware of (1) are concerned. True. 
But then surely any reasonably well-informed contemporary Westerner is likely to 
be aware of (1). 
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Third, the X-claim argument is not a threat to religious belief systems of which X-
claims do not form an essential part. For then the X-claims might be dropped while 
the belief system is retained. However, typically, mainstream believers of 
mainstream religions consider a number of X-claims to be essential to their 
religion. For example, most Christians consider belief in the resurrection essential 
to their faith. The X-claim argument constitutes a threat to Christianity as that 
majority understand it. 
 
Fourth, (1) might be challenged on the grounds that by an 'X-claim' I really just 
mean a claim concerning something 'spooky', i.e. concerning the existence of 
something that, by the scientific standards of the time, counts as mysterious or 
hard to account for naturalistically. But then it's by no means obvious that the 
majority of such 'X-claims' are false. Consider, for example, the surprising claim 
that two spatially isolated objects (i.e. two electrons in locations sufficiently far 
apart that information would need to travel faster than the speed of light to get 
from one to another) can be such that a change in one affects a change in the other. 
When this prediction was made, the best physics of the day struggled to account 
for its truth. Indeed, its truth appeared to require the operation of what Einstein 
called 'spooky action at a distance'. But then wasn't this 'spooky' prediction an X-
claim, an X-claim now widely considered true? Science provide numerous other 
examples of beliefs that are, or were, X-claims, and that are, or are very probably, 
true. So it is not obvious that a majority of X-claim beliefs are false. 
 
The above objection is based on misunderstanding. To begin with, note that, as I 
define X-claims, they are claims specifically about hidden agents. The above 
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prediction concerning quantum entanglement involved no such agents, merely 
something Einstein found 'spooky'. That we're highly prone to false belief in 
'spooky' things is a vague and easily contestable claim. That we're highly prone to 
false positive beliefs in invisible agents is a well-established and far more 
precisely articulated fact for which scientists are now developing a range of 
scientific explanations. Further, note that prediction about quantum entanglement, 
even if it did constitute and X-claim (which it doesn't), is in any case not grounded 
in S&T. The X-claim argument requires only that we be prone to false positive X-
claim beliefs when they are grounded in S&T, not that we be prone to false 
positive X-claim beliefs when grounded in some other way, e.g. experimentally.  
 
The fifth objection is that the X-claim argument doesn't threaten religious X-claim 
beliefs grounded in something other than S&T. So for example, for someone who 
accepts theism on the basis of a philosophical argument, the X-claim argument does 
not, as it stands, generate a rationality defeater. However, notice that the core 
doctrines of religious belief systems usually extend far beyond what philosophical 
and non-testimony-dependent scientific argument are thought, even by the faithful, 
to support. That Jesus was raised from the dead, for example, is a Christian X-claim 
belief that even the Christian will presumably acknowledge is grounded in S&T. 
The resurrection doesn’t appear to be the sort of thing that could be established by 
means of armchair, philosophical reflection, for example. But then, even if theism 
can be shown to be invulnerable to the X-claim argument (given some sound 
philosophical argument for theism), Christianity, in so far as it requires the 
resurrection, still faces a rationality defeater. Moreover, note that the X-claim 
argument, if cogent, pulls away the safety net that an appeal to subjective 
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experience might otherwise seem to have offered theists should their philosophical 
and scientific argument for theism turn out not to be cogent. The X-claim argument, 
if sound, makes the rationality of theism turn crucially on the success of such 
arguments. 
 
Here's the sixth objection. Surely, the X-claim argument establishes at best that, in 
so far as the beliefs are grounded in some combination of S&T, we should be 
sceptical about the beliefs that angels, ghosts, fairies, demons, spirit guides, 
ancestors, gods, and so on exist, but not whether extraordinary invisible agents 
exist. For perhaps, on most of the occasions on which we take ourselves to be 
experiencing some sort of extraordinary hidden agency, we really are experiencing 
such agency - it's just the way in which we categorise that agency that's mistaken. 
Our cultural expectations etc. misleadingly colour what we experience, leading us 
to suppose we're experiencing ghosts, fairies, demons, spirit guides, ancestors, 
gods, and so on, when in truth none of these things exist, though the extraordinary 
hidden agents do. But then the fact that we know we're highly unreliable judges of 
whether angels, ghosts, fairies, spirit guides, gods, are present should not lead us 
to conclude we are unreliable judges of whether hidden agency is present, and so 
should not lead us to be sceptical about the existence of such hidden agency per 
se, even if scepticism regarding the particular ways in which we characterise that 
agency is warranted.8 
 
I'll make three comments in this response to this sixth objection. 
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First, once we know we know that, when it comes to extraordinary hidden agency, 
we're highly unreliable judges of what such agency is like, that can (in at least 
some circumstances) suffice to raise justified doubts about our ability to judge 
whether there's any agency there at all. Suppose Ted, Bert, Sarah, and Alice enter 
a room in turn and report back what they observe. Ted reports he saw just a twenty 
foot giant in the room, Bert just a two inch high fairy, Sarah just a full-size lion, 
and Alice just a small flying bird. Their diversity of opinion won't just lead us to 
doubt whether there's a giant, fairy, lion, or bird in the room; we'll also be 
justifiably sceptical about whether there's any agent in the room at all. Scepticism 
about even the existence of agency appears justified when there's not just 
disagreement, but very dramatic disagreement, about its character, as in the above 
case. But isn't dramatic disagreement just what we're presented with when we turn 
to belief in X-claims about fairies, ghosts, spirits, gods, angels, demons, and so 
on? 
 
Second, the above objection overlooks the fact that what evidence we have 
concerning the unreliability of our judgements about extraordinary hidden agency 
extends well beyond mere diversity of opinion about what such agency is like. 
Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that widespread disagreement establishes 
only that we're unreliable judges of what such agency is like, not whether it's there. 
Still, there remains considerable other evidence that we are highly prone to 
judging such agency is present when it's not. We have a well-documented 
tendency to over attribute agency on the basis of minimal cues (French and Stone 
(2013), 197). There is, for example, our well-established tendency to think agency 
is present when it's not due to e.g. pareidolia - the tendency to see faces, hear 
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voices, and so on where there are none. As we noted earlier, there's also much 
compelling evidence of the falsehood of a large proportion of our S&T-grounded 
beliefs in the even the presence of such extraordinary hidden agency. See the 
previously discussed examples of the Cottingley fairies, the Flatwoods monster, 
and the sneezing ghost of Haunted Homes. There weren't real, extraordinary 
hidden agents that the young Cottingley girls mistook for fairies; rather, there were 
no such agents at all - just paper cut outs. There wasn't an extraordinary being 
from The Beyond wandering Flatwoods, just a barn owl. There wasn't an 
extraordinary hidden agent that was mistakenly categorised as a ghost in that 
Haunted Homes episode; rather, there was no extraordinary agent at all - just an 
air-freshener. And so on. 
 
Thirdly, even if it were true (which it isn't) that we're justified in being skeptical 
only about our categorisation of such hidden agency, not belief in its existence, 
even such limited scepticism will in any case spell doom for much religious belief. 
For, in so far as religious belief does involve belief in such extraordinary hidden 
agency, it tends essentially to involve specific categorisations of it (as e.g. an 
extraordinary hidden agency worthy of our worship, deserving our gratitude, as 
and so on). 
 
I'll finish with a more general comment about the above objections. Note that, even 
if we were to deny (2), insisting that learning (1) fails to provide a full rationality 
defeater for any X-claim belief grounded in S&T, it may be that learning (1) should 
at least lead those whose X-claim belief are grounded in just S&T to hold those 
beliefs less firmly, perhaps much less firmly. In which case the X-claim argument 
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might still contribute, perhaps significantly, towards a cumulative case for 
skepticism regarding religious X-claim beliefs grounded in S&T.  
 
PART TWO: CONTRAST WITH THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS 
DIVERSITY AND NATURALISTIC DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS 
 
The X-claim argument is related to, but distinct from, two other popular arguments 
against religious belief, arguments currently receiving philosophical attention: 
arguments from religious diversity and naturalistic debunking arguments. As we 
shall see, the X-claim argument has the advantage of sidestepping certain stock 
objections to those other arguments. I begin with the arguments from diversity, 
which have been developed by Schellenberg (2000), Feldman (2007), Christianson 
(2009), and others. A recent example is sketched below. 
 
7. The argument from religious diversity 
 
Each of the major religions can boast good numbers of people who are intelligent, 
religiously well-informed, and otherwise competent assessors of evidence, who 
nevertheless disagree with each other over which religion is true. This systematic 
disagreement reveals that a substantial percentage of those party to the 
disagreement must be mistaken. This in turn strongly suggests that there is a good 
deal of unreliability in the processes used to arrive at their competing positions. But 
then, as Sanford Goldberg, a recent proponent of this argument, summarizes 
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…insofar as the parties to the dispute are otherwise quite competent 
epistemically, it begins to seem that no side should be particularly 
confident that it has gotten things right on the matter at hand. The facts 
constituting the systematic disagreement are (second order) evidence on 
the basis of which one’s confidence in one’s having attained truth 
would be unwarranted. And insofar as no side should be particularly 
confident, it seems that no side should believe. (2014, 286) 
 
Goldberg concludes that such religious disagreement constitutes a defeater for the 
beliefs concerned. 
 
The X-claim argument and Goldberg’s version of the argument from religious 
diversity are clearly related. Goldberg’s argument takes disagreements between 
intelligent and well-informed disputants to generate some sort of defeater for 
religious belief. The X-claim argument similarly concludes that (many) religious 
beliefs at least face a rationality defeater, and it may draw on the very same 
disagreements as evidence. However, note that the X-claim argument appeals not 
just to disagreement but to a much broader range of evidence of unreliability.  
 
Considered in isolation, mere disagreement between intelligent and well-informed 
disputants, if it discredits the competing beliefs at all, discredits them all, including, 
in this case, non-belief or atheism. The X-claim argument, by contrast, brings into 
play a wider range of evidence to support, not the view that every party to the 
dispute has a pretty good chance of being mistaken, but that those who believe 
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religious X-claims on the basis of subjective experience and testimony are far more 
likely to be mistaken than are the skeptics. 
 
Exclusivists suppose one religion has it mostly right and the others go seriously 
wrong. Exclusivists typically respond to the argument from religious diversity by 
raising the following two objections: 
 
The 'proves too much' objection. If systematic disagreement between the intelligent 
and well-informed is sufficient to require that we withhold from believing, then we 
will have to withhold in many other spheres too, such as the political, philosophical 
and moral spheres. Yet surely I can continue reasonably to maintain my political, 
philosophical, or moral position even whilst acknowledging that there is a good 
number of intelligent well-informed people that disagree with me. In short, the 
principle on which the argument from disagreement is based, if applied consistently, 
would require us to embrace an absurdly wide-ranging political, philosophical, and 
moral skepticism.  
 
Alvin Plantinga uses a hypothetical example to elicit the intuition that we might 
reasonably continue to hold a moral belief even after discovering others disagree. 
Suppose you think it wrong for a counselor to use his position of trust to seduce a 
client, but you discover others disagree: they think it a minor peccadillo, like 
running a red light when there’s no traffic. Plantinga suggests that even if you think 
the dissenters have the same ‘internal markers’ for their beliefs (it seems no less 
obvious to them that they are right, even after careful reflection, etc.), you can 
reasonably continue to maintain your belief, and perhaps become even more 
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committed to it after additional reflection. You may suppose that those others are in 
some epistemic way less fortunate or well-placed than you. (Plantinga (2000), 190). 
But if you are entitled to stick to your guns in the political, philosophical and moral 
case, then why not in religious case?  
 
The problem of self-defeat. Intelligent, well-informed epistemologists disagree 
about whether we should withhold belief on discovering that there are intelligent 
and well-informed individuals who disagree. But then consistency requires 
proponents of the argument from religious diversity to abandon the very principle 
on which their argument is based: that where such disagreement occurs, belief 
should be abandoned. 
 
Whether or not the argument from religious diversity succumbs to the above two 
objections, the X-claim argument avoids them. 
 
The X-claim argument avoids the 'proves too much' objection for it does not require 
that where there is disagreement between the intelligent and well-informed, belief 
should be withheld. The X-claim argument allows the bar requiring that belief be 
withheld to be set much higher than that, as the following analogy makes clear. 
 
Suppose a space probe is sent to a remote planet on which it is suspected life might 
exist. The probe transmits back to Earth data from which scientists subsequently 
draw very different conclusions. Some scientists believe the data reveals there are 
trees are growing at the landing site. Others believe the data reveals not trees but 
flowers. Still others believe the data reveals neither trees nor flowers but ferns. 
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There are also scientists who are undecided, and scientists who believe, on the basis 
of the transmitted data, that no plant life is present at the landing site. 
 
Clearly, not all these intelligent, well-informed scientists can be correct. Their 
disagreement reveals many must be mistaken. That disagreement, considered in 
isolation, casts a shadow of suspicion over all their respective verdicts. 
 
On discovering their disagreement, should these scientists withhold from believing 
their respective verdicts? Perhaps not. Perhaps such skepticism is, at this point, 
unwarranted. After all, if they are to abandon a verdict whenever they discover 
intelligent, well-informed people disagree, then the fact that there’s disagreement 
among the scientists about whether verdicts should be abandoned in such 
circumstances should lead them to abandon their verdict that such verdicts should 
be abandoned (the problem of self-defeat).  
 
But now suppose further evidence is discovered indicating that the lab where all 
these scientists are working has been infected with some as yet unidentified causal 
agent that has a strange psychological effect – it strongly inclines scientists to 
believe they have discovered one or another form of plant life whether or not 
they’ve actually done so. This agent, whatever it turns out to be, produces a high 
proportion of false positive beliefs. 
 
The shadow of suspicion generated by their mere disagreement fell on all the 
scientists’ respective verdicts. This new evidence shifts that shadow away from the 
verdict of those scientists who were skeptical about the presence of plant life and 
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deepens it very considerably over the verdicts of those claiming there is one or 
other form of plant life growing at the landing site. Perhaps, prior to this last 
discovery, all of the scientists concerned might reasonably have maintained their 
respective beliefs about plant life on the planet, notwithstanding their disagreement. 
But, given this new evidence, surely those scientists who previously judged there to 
be plant life present should now be revising their verdict.  
 
The X-claim argument similarly points, not merely to disagreement between 
intelligent and well-informed individuals about which of various competing X-
claims, if any, are true, but to evidence of some sort of causal factor or factors 
(perhaps as yet unidentified) strongly inclining humans to believe X-claims on the 
basis of S&T irrespective of whether those claims are true, with the result that 
there’s a high proportion of false positive beliefs. My suggestion is that this 
additional evidence should lead X-claim believers to withhold, even if mere 
disagreement concerning competing X-claims should not. 
 
The X-claim argument is also immune to the problem of self-defeat. It is not self-
defeating in the way the argument from religious diversity is supposed to be, for it 
does not depend on the thought that where there is disagreement between the 
intelligent and well-informed, belief should be withheld. 
 
8. Naturalistic debunking arguments 
A number of arguments against religious belief have been offered grounded in the 
thought that religious belief can, in one way or another, be explained 
naturalistically. 
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Marx and Freud offer such naturalistic explanations. According to Marx, religious 
belief is a product of social dysfunction and dislocation. According to Freud, 
religious belief is a result of wish fulfilment. More recently, evolutionary 
psychology has offered naturalistic explanations of religious beliefs in terms of, for 
example, the HADD (mentioned above) and minimally counterintuitive concepts9. 
Such naturalistic explanations may be supposed not just to explain religious belief, 
but to explain it away. For example, in Breaking the Spell (2010) Daniel Dennett 
argues that findings in the cognitive science of religion support atheism. 
 
Why suppose such explanations don’t just explain religious belief but explain it 
away? As characterized by Guy Kahane, debunking arguments are ‘arguments that 
show the causal origins of a belief to be an undermining defeater.’ (2010, 106) 
While all beliefs have explanations, not all have explanations in terms of processes 
that, as Kahane puts it, ‘track the truth’. If someone decides on whether or not to 
believe that p by flipping a coin, there would be no connection between their means 
of forming belief and the truth. Kahane calls processes that are not truth-tracking 
‘off track’. According to Kahane, the second-order belief that a certain belief was 
formed by an off-track process can constitute an undermining defeater for that 
belief if the off track process ‘leaves no space for the contribution of processes that 
would, in this context, track the truth’. 
 
To illustrate, in the coin-flipping example, the process generating the belief is not 
just off-track, but such that it squeezes out contributions from processes that are, as 
it were, on-track. That's not always the case. You might explain my belief that there 
 32 
are fish in the local river by pointing to my strong desire to believe there are fish 
there. Now it may be true that my strong desire to believe did indeed play an 
important causal role in producing my belief: without it, I would not have 
investigated the river. But while that strong desire is an off-track mechanism 
playing some significant role in the production of my belief, it doesn't preclude an 
on-track process playing a role, and so it doesn't preclude my knowing there are 
fish in the river because, say, after investigating as a result of my strong desire I 
actually caught one. 
 
If Kahane is correct, Marxist, Freudian, or evolutionary explanations of religious 
belief will succeed in debunking religious belief only if they invoke off-track 
processes leaving no room for processes that are on-track.  
 
How might religious belief be defended against such naturalistic debunking 
arguments? Such argument are often criticized on the grounds that, while the 
explanations offered might account for religious belief, little reason is supplied for 
supposing the explanations are actually correct. Plantinga raises this objection with 
respect to Freud who, Plantinga notes, offers ‘no more than the most perfunctory 
argument’ that religious belief actually is a product of wish fulfilment (Plantinga 
(2000b), 195-6). Evolutionary explanations of religious belief have similarly been 
criticized for offering little more than ‘just so’ stories lacking evidential support. 
(see e.g. Ratcliffe (2006), 94). 
 
A second standard line of defence against naturalistic debunking arguments is to 
suggest that, even if the explanation offered is correct, that’s not yet to say religious 
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belief is debunked. There may be reason to distrust religious beliefs that are purely 
a product of social dysfunction, or wish fulfilment, or an HADD, as these are 
mechanisms we can have little confidence will produce true beliefs. But why 
should the involvement of these off-track processes preclude the involvement of 
processes that are on-track? 
 
So, for example, Plantinga says about Freud’s explanation of religious belief that 
while wish fulfilment might not generally be aimed at truth, in the case of theistic 
belief it could be. Plantinga suggests God may have designed us with a deep need 
to believe in him and be aware of his presence – that's how God has arranged for us 
to come to know him. If so, then the mechanism governing the formation of theistic 
belief is aimed at true belief even if that belief arises from wish fulfilment. And so 
it can still deliver knowledge. (Plantinga (2000b), 197) Psychologist Justin Barrett 
similarly insists that finding natural mechanisms that account for religious beliefs 
fails to debunk them: ‘Christian theology teaches that people were crafted by God 
to be in a loving relationship with him and other people… Why wouldn’t God, 
then, design us in such a way as to find belief in divinity quite natural?’10 
Philosopher Michael Murray concurs: ‘God set up the natural conditions so that, 
pace the objection, natural selection does select for reliable religious belief forming 
mechanisms’ (Murray (2007), 398). In short: the correctness of an explanation of 
religious belief in terms some natural process that is usually off-track does not 
preclude that process forming part of some larger, divinely-engineered process that 
is on-track. 
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Whether or not the above two objections to naturalistic debunking arguments 
against religious belief succeed, the X-claim argument, while closely related to 
such debunking arguments, is immune to them. Of course the X-claim argument 
has something in common with naturalistic debunking arguments. Both aim to 
provide a kind of defeater for religious belief, and both aim to do this by providing 
evidence of there being something unreliable or untrustworthy about the way 
religious beliefs are formed. However, unlike Freudian, Marxist, and evolutionary 
debunking arguments targeting some specific religious belief, the X-claim 
argument does not require some particular naturalistic explanation of the target 
belief be correct. The X-claim argument merely points to our systematic 
unreliability with respect to religious and other X-claim beliefs (when grounded in 
S&T) and concludes that this supplies a rationality defeater for anyone who 
believes an X-claim on the basis of S&T. It’s evidence of our general human 
proneness to false belief in X-claims when grounded in S&T, rather than evidence 
of the correctness of any particular explanation for the target X-claim religious 
belief, that is supposed to generate the defeater. It matters not what the correct 
explanation for the target belief is. Indeed, it might actually be a product of some 
divinely-engineered, wholly supernatural, on-track process (the operation of a 
sensus divinitatis, say). My suggestion is: given the range of evidence we have 
regarding belief in X-claims, an X-claim belief grounded in S&T - even if it is as a 
matter of fact a product of such a divinely-engineered, on-track process - still faces 
a rationality defeater.  
 
So it appears the X-claim argument is invulnerable to both the above objections to 
naturalistic debunking arguments. 
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9. A novel argument? 
 
I'll address one final objection: that the X-claim argument rests on the argument 
from diversity and naturalistic debunking arguments. Why do I suppose we are 
systematically unreliable judges regarding X-claims? Isn't part of my case for 
supposing we're unreliable judges of the truth regarding X-claims provided by X-
claim diversity? Further, doesn't my case for that unreliability depend on my 
supposing some sort of non-truth-tracking natural mechanism is responsible for 
producing many positive X-claim beliefs? But then don't my reasons for believing 
we are unreliable judges of X-claims boil down to just (i) that there substantial 
disagreement about X-claims, and (ii) that X-claims have been naturalistically 
debunked? In which case, my argument for religious skepticism isn't novel: it rests 
on the argument from diversity and naturalistic debunking arguments 
 
This objection is based on misunderstanding. My claim is that we are highly prone 
to false positive X-claim beliefs when they are grounded in just S&T, and this 
provides us with a rationality defeater for such beliefs. Note, first, that the claim 
that such beliefs can be explained naturalistically plays no role in my argument. It's 
not the likely correctness of some naturalistic explanation for our proneness to false 
positive X-claim beliefs that provides the rationality defeater, but that proneness 
itself, which various naturalistic mechanisms have been invoked to explain. Indeed, 
even if it turned out our proneness to false positive X-claim beliefs had some non-
natural cause (it turned out, say, that some mischievous demon is causing us 
mistakenly to suppose our dead ancestors, gods, etc. are revealing themselves), that 
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wouldn't undermine the X-claim argument. Secondly, while diversity of X-claim 
belief plays some role in supporting the claim that we're systematically prone to 
error when it comes to X-claim beliefs, it is not - as it is in the argument from 
religious diversity - diversity alone that is supposed to generate a defeater, but that 
diversity in combination with considerable evidence for a proneness to false 
positive beliefs. It's that further evidence that gives the X-claim argument two 
significant advantages over arguments from diversity: it avoids both the 'proves too 
much' objection and the problem of self-defeat. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I hope this paper will give pause for thought to those who believe that standard 
objections to the argument from religious diversity and naturalistic debunking 
arguments have effectively neutralised those arguments against religious belief. 
Perhaps they have. However, there appears to be another argument in the vicinity 
that is rather more formidable: an argument that has, until now, been overlooked.  
 
 
References 
 
BARRETT, JUSTIN L. (2004) Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Lanham 
Sylvialand: AltaMira Press) 
BOYER, PASCAL  (2002) Religion Explained, The Evolutionary Origins of 
Religious Thought. New edition. (London: Vintage). 
 37 
CHRISTIANSON, DAVID (2009) 'Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology 
of Controversy', Philosophy Compass, 5, 756 –756. 
CLARK, KELLY JAMES AND BARRETT, JUSTIN. L. (2010) 'Reformed 
Epistemology and The Cognitive Science of Religion', Faith and Philosophy, 27, 
174-189. 
CONAN DOYLE, ARTHUR (2001) The Coming of The Fairies (Calgary, Alberta: 
Theophania Publishing). 
DENNETT, DANIEL (2010) Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural 
Phenomenon (London: Penguin). 
FELDMAN, RICHARD (2006) Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In 
Epistemology Futures, HETHERINGTON, STEPHEN (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
FRENCH, CHRISTOPHER C. and STONE, ANNA (2013) Anomalistic 
Psychology (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). 
GOLDBERG, SANFORD C. (2014) 'Does Externalist Epistemology Rationalize 
Religious Commitment?', in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, CALLAHAN, 
LAURA FRANCES and O'CONNER, TIMOTHY (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 279-298.  
KAHANE, GUY (2010) 'Evolutionary debunking Arguments', Nous, 45, 103-125. 
LACKEY, JENNIFER (2003) 'A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the 
Epistemology of Testimony', Nous, 37, 706-723. 
LASONEN AARNIO, M. (2010) 'Unreasonable Knowledge', Philosophical 
Perspectives, 24. 1-21. 
MURRAY, M. J. (2007) 'Four Arguments That the Cognitive Psychology of 
Religion Undermines the Justification of Religious Belief', in BULBULIA. J. et al., 
 38 
(eds). Evolution  of Religion: Studies, Theories, and Critiques (Santa Margarita, 
CA: The Collins Foundation  Press), 394-398. 
NICKELL, JOE. (2001) Real-Life X-Files: Investigating the Paranormal 
(Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky). 
PINKER, STEVEN. (2004) 'The Evolutionary Psychology of Religion', speech 
given at the annual meeting of the Freedom from Religion Foundation, Madison, 
Wisconsin, October 29, 2004, on Pinker’s receipt of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes 
Award’. Available online at: 
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2004_10_29_religion.htm 
PLANTINGA, ALVIN. (2000a) 'Pluralism', In The Philosophical Challenge of 
Religious Diversity, QUINN, PHILIP L. AND MEEKER, KEVIN (eds.) (New 
York: Oxford University Press), 172-192. 
 (2000b) Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
RATCLIFFE, MATTHEW (2006) 'Neurotheology', In MCNAMARA PATRICK 
(ed.) Where God And Science Meet: The Neurology Of Religious Experience 
(Westport: Praeger), 81-104. 
SCHELLENBERG, J. L. (2000) 'Religious Experience and Religious Diversity: A 
Reply to Alston', in The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, QUINN, 
PHILIP L. and MEEKER, KEVIN. (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press), 
208–217. 
WILLIAMSON, TIMOTHY  (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
                                                        
1 Source: Jan-Feb issue of The Skeptical Inquirer 2006. 
2 I choose this title partly because such beings were a focus of The X-Files TV 
programme. 
 39 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 Robert Carroll, 'Pranks, Frauds, and Hoaxes from Around the World', Skeptical 
Inquirer vol 28.4 July/Aug 2004. 
4 Related to me by Professor Chris French who was involved in the programme.  
5 See Joe Nickell, 'The Flatwoods UFO Monster', Skeptical Inquirer vol 24.6, 
Nov/Dec 2000. 
6 Of course, if a certain deity exists, then everyone who disbelieves in that deity 
holds a false negative belief. Still, the track record of disbelieving in deities remains 
strong given the vast majority of deities in which people disbelieve don't exist. 
7 Safety conditions on knowledge are associated particularly with Williamson, 
Sosa, and Pritchard. A simple example of a safety condition says S knows P only 
if S is safe from error; that is, there must be no risk that S believes falsely in a 
similar case. For an example of the safety view see Williamson (2000),  
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
9 Minimally counter-intuitive concepts are concepts that mostly fit with our usual 
preconceptions about objects but break with them in one or two ways. This makes 
them attention grabbing and easy to remember. Talking animals and non-corporeal 
agents are examples. See Boyer (2002)  
10 Quoted by Robin Marantz Henig ‘Darwin’s God’ in The Guardian, 4 March 
2007. 
